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Abstract. We consider the role of the foundation axiom and var-
ious anti-foundation axioms in connection with the nature and ex-
istence of elementary self-embeddings of the set-theoretic universe.
We shall investigate the role of the foundation axiom and the vari-
ous anti-foundation axioms in connection with the nature and exis-
tence of elementary self-embeddings of the set-theoretic universe. All
the standard proofs of the well-known Kunen inconsistency [Kun78],
for example, the theorem asserting that there is no nontrivial elemen-
tary embedding of the set-theoretic universe to itself, make use of the
axiom of foundation (see [Kan04, HKP12]), and this use is essential,
assuming that ZFC is consistent, because there are models of ZFC−f
that admit nontrivial elementary self-embeddings and even nontrivial
definable automorphisms. Meanwhile, a fragment of the Kunen incon-
sistency survives without foundation as the claim in ZFC−f that there
is no nontrivial elementary self-embedding of the class of well-founded
sets. Nevertheless, some of the commonly considered anti-foundational
theories, such as the Boffa theory BAFA, prove outright the existence of
nontrivial automorphisms of the set-theoretic universe, thereby refuting
the Kunen assertion in these theories. On the other hand, several other
common anti-foundational theories, such as Aczel’s anti-foundational
theory ZFC−f +AFA and Scott’s theory ZFC−f +SAFA, reach the op-
posite conclusion by proving that there are no nontrivial elementary
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embeddings from the set-theoretic universe to itself. Thus, the res-
olution of the Kunen inconsistency in set theory without foundation
depends on the specific nature of one’s anti-foundational stance.
In this article, we should like to extend those results and examine the
full range of possibility of these various anti-foundational axioms with
the existence of such self-embeddings, showing for example that there
are models of set theory having automorphisms, but no elementary
self-embeddings (theorem 4), or having elementary self-embeddings,
but no automorphisms (theorem 11), or having a prescribed group of
automorphisms (theorem 12), among other possibilities.
1. Foundation and anti-foundation
The axiom of foundation is one of the standard axioms of the Zermelo–
Fraenkel (ZFC) axiomatization of set theory, asserting that the set-
membership relation ∈ is well-founded, so that every nonempty set has
an ∈-minimal member. Thus, the foundation axiom allows for proofs
by ∈-induction, and indeed the axiom is equivalent to the ∈-induction
scheme. To give one immediate consequence, the axiom of foundation
refutes x ∈ x for any set x, for in this case {x} would have no ∈-
minimal element; in particular, the axiom of foundation rules out the
existence of Quine atoms, sets x for which x = {x}. Beyond this, the
axiom of foundation girds much of the large-scale conceptual framework
by which many set-theorists understand the cumulative universe of all
sets. For example, one uses it to prove in ZF that every set appears
at some level Vα of the von Neumann hierarchy, for if every element of
a set x appears in some Vα, then x itself appears in Vβ+1, where β is
larger than the ranks of the elements of x, and so by ∈-induction every
set appears. Similarly, the axiom of foundation implies that every tran-
sitive set A is rigid, meaning that there is no nontrivial isomorphism of
〈A,∈〉 with itself, for if pi : A→ A is an isomorphism and pi fixes every
element b ∈ a for some a ∈ A, then it follows easily that pi must also
fix a, and so pi is the identity function by ∈-induction.
Meanwhile, there are several commonly considered anti-foundational
set theories, which we shall now briefly review. Most of these theories
include the base theory we denote by ZFC−f , which consists of all
axioms of ZFC (including the collection and separation axiom schemes)
except for the axiom of foundation.1 Similarly, GBC−f denotes GBC
1Just as in the case of set theory ZFC−p without the power set axiom (see
[GHJ]), one should take care to use the collection axiom plus separation in ZFC−f ,
rather than merely the replacement axiom, because these are no longer equivalent
without foundation, although they are again equivalent without foundation in the
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without the axiom of foundation. In particular, please note that the
theory GBC−f includes the global axiom of choice, which asserts that
there is a class relation that is a set-like well-ordering of all sets; this
will be important in a few of our arguments. We shall sometimes
also desire the global choice axiom in a context closer to ZFC−f ; in
order to achieve this, we expand the language of set theory with a
new function symbol C, and work in the theory we denote ZFGC−f ,
which has all the ZFC−f axioms including instances of the collection
and separation schemes for the expanded language, plus the assertion
that C : Ord → V is a bijection of the class of ordinals with the class
of all sets.
Perhaps the most commonly used axiom in non-well-founded set the-
ory is the anti-foundation axiom, denoted AFA, first investigated by
Forti and Honsell [FH83] and then popularized by Aczel [Acz88] and
Barwise and Moss [BM96]. The axiom has found numerous applications
in computer science and formal semantics. Viale [Via04] investigated
the constructible universe under AFA. In one formulation, AFA asserts
that every directed graph 〈A, e〉 has a unique decoration, which is a
mapping a 7→ f(a) of the elements of A to sets, such that
f(a) = {f(b) | b e a}
for every a ∈ A. This axiom therefore extends Mostowski’s observation
on well-founded relations to apply universally to all directed graphs.
For example, by considering a graph with exactly one point and an
edge from that point to itself, it follows that under AFA, there is a
unique Quine atom a = { a }.
Since there are many equivalent formulations of the anti-foundation
axiom, let us mention a few more of them. Define that a partial (in-
verse) bisimulation between directed graphs 〈A, e〉 and 〈A′, e′〉 is a re-
lation ∼ ⊆ A×A′ such that:2
(1) For every x ∈ A and x′, y′ ∈ A′ such that x ∼ x′ and y′ e′ x′,
there exists a y ∈ A such that y e x and y ∼ y′.
presence of any of IE, BAFA, V = WF(t) for a set t, or global choice. To see the
inequivalence, consider a model with ω many Quine atoms, but take only those sets
in some WF(t) for any finite set t of such atoms, so that the full set of atoms never
appears; the replacement axiom holds in this model, but not collection.
2These are technically inverse bisimulations, which have the appropriate direc-
tionality for expressing AFA using the ∈ relation, as we have done here, but we
shall drop this ‘inverse’ qualifier. Other accounts of AFA use the usual bisimula-
tion directionality, but instead invert the set-membership relation to ∋, in effect
inverting the direction of all the graphs here.
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(2) For every x′ ∈ A′ and x, y ∈ A such that x ∼ x′ and y e x,
there exists a y′ ∈ A′ such that y′ e′ x′ and y ∼ y′.
Such a bisimulation is total if dom(∼) = A and ran(∼) = A′, in which
case the two structures are called bisimilar. The anti-foundation axiom
AFA is equivalent to the statement that every binary relation 〈A, e〉
is bisimilar with 〈t,∈〉 for a unique transitive set t. Thus, the axiom
generalizes the situation in ZF, where Mostowski’s argument shows that
every well-founded directed graph is bisimilar to a unique transitive set;
under AFA we get this for all directed graphs.
For another variant of AFA, define that an accessible pointed graph
is a triple 〈A, e, a〉 where e ⊆ A×A and a is an element of A to which
every element of A is related by the reflexive transitive closure of e. For
example, the canonical picture of a set a is 〈TC({a}),∈, a〉, and this is
an accessible pointed graph. Again generalizing the situation in ZF for
well-founded relations, the anti-foundation axiom AFA is equivalent to
the assertion that an accessible pointed graph 〈A, e, a〉 is isomorphic
to a canonical picture of a set if and only if it is strongly extensional,
meaning that every partial bisimulation from 〈A, e〉 to itself agrees with
the identity relation on A.
Scott [Sco60] considered an anti-foundation axiom—following Aczel
we shall denote it by SAFA—based on trees instead of arbitrary ac-
cessible pointed graphs. An accessible pointed graph 〈A, e, a〉 is a tree
if every vertex has a unique e-path to a. For example, the canonical
tree picture of a set a is the tree whose vertices are finite sequences
〈x0, . . . , xn〉 where x0 = a, and xi+1 ∈ xi for every i < n; we may think
of the tree as growing downwards, so that child nodes correspond to
elements. In ZF, one may easily prove that the canonical tree picture
of a set has no nontrivial automorphisms, since every such automor-
phism would give rise to an automorphism of the transitive closure
of the set. The Scott anti-foundation axiom SAFA generalizes this to
the non-wellfounded realm by asserting that a tree is isomorphic to a
canonical tree picture of a set if and only if it has no nontrivial auto-
morphism. To illustrate, observe that under SAFA, there is precisely
one Quine atom: there cannot be two, because if a and b were dis-
tinct Quine atoms, then the canonical tree picture of the doubleton
set { a, b } would have a nontrivial automorphism, swapping a and b;
and there must be at least one, because the tree consisting of a single
infinite descending chain is rigid, and so there must be sets an with
an = { an+1 }; but these must all be equal, because if an 6= am, then
the tree picture of the doubleton { an, am } consists of two descending
chains joined at the top, and this tree is not rigid.
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More generally, we say that two transitive sets s and t are isomorphic
if there is an isomorphism of the structure 〈s,∈〉 with 〈t,∈〉. In the case
of non-transitive sets, we say that two sets x and y are isomorphic, if
they can be placed into transitive sets having an isomorphism mapping
x to y, or equivalently, if the transitive closures of { x } and { y } are
isomorphic by an isomorphism mapping x to y. Thus, two sets are
isomorphic if and only if their canonical pictures are isomorphic as
accessible pointed graphs. Finsler [Fin26] developed non-well-founded
set theory based on the informal principle that the universe of sets is
maximal, subject to maintaining the axioms of extensionality and of
isomorphism extensionality :
(IE) Isomorphic sets are equal.
This axiom implies immediately that there is at most one Quine atom,
since any two would be isomorphic. Aczel [Acz88] formalized Finsler’s
idea in an axiom denoted FAFA, which asserts that an accessible pointed
graph G = 〈A, e, a〉 is isomorphic to a canonical picture of a set if and
only if it is extensional (that is, satisfies the axiom of extensionality)
and the accessible pointed graph Gu of points accessing u is not iso-
morphic to Gv for distinct u, v ∈ A.
Actually, Aczel introduced an entire family of axioms AFA∼, one for
each so-called regular bisimulation concept ∼. Each axiom character-
izes canonical pictures as accessible pointed graphs satisfying a version
of extensionality appropriate for ∼, and particular choices of ∼ yield
the axioms AFA, SAFA, and FAFA. Each AFA∼ can be thought of
as consisting of two parts: existence (stating that certain accessible
pointed graph correspond to canonical pictures) and uniqueness (as-
serting a strengthening of the extensionality axiom). Larger ∼ lead to
weaker existence assertions and stronger uniqueness assertions. The
extremes are FAFA and AFA, which correspond to the smallest and
largest regular bisimulation, respectively. In particular, the uniqueness
part of every AFA∼ implies IE, which is the uniqueness part of FAFA.
Boffa [Bof72] introduced a theory which maximizes the universe of
sets with respect to the plain axiom of extensionality, thus badly vi-
olating the isomorphism extensionality axiom IE. A weak version of
Boffa’s axiom postulates that every extensional binary relation 〈a, e〉
is isomorphic to 〈t,∈〉 for a transitive set t. The drawback of this
statement is that it provides no easy way of extending existing sets:
even if 〈a, e〉 already includes a set 〈t0,∈〉 as its transitive part, the
isomorphism from a to t does not have to preserve it, as there may be
many sets isomorphic to t0. For this reason, the full Boffa’s axiom (the
axiom of superuniversality), denoted here BAFA, asserts that for every
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transitive set t0 and every extensional binary relation 〈a, e〉 that end-
extends 〈t0,∈〉, meaning t0 ⊆ a and ∈ ↾ t0 = e ∩ (a × t0), there exists
a transitive set t, and an isomorphism from 〈a, e〉 to 〈t,∈〉 that is the
identity on t0. Thus, the axiom asserts a kind of saturation property
for the transitive sets, namely, that they realize the types expressed by
extensional binary relations end-extending a given transitive set. For
example, under BAFA, there must be a proper class of Quine atoms,
since we can extend the canonical picture of a given set of Quine atoms
by a relation that describes what it would be like to have one more,
or κ many more for any cardinality κ, and this new relation must be
realized in a transitive set, which will have corresponding additional
actual Quine atoms.
This level of saturation causes a high degree of homogeneity in any
set-theoretic universe satisfying BAFA, where we have many distinct
but isomorphic copies of whatever structure is produced. Such homo-
geneity, in turn, can cause a difficulty in class-length constructions by
transfinite recursion, since the constructed objects are rarely unique,
and so one cannot usually pick out the precise continuation of a given
transfinite construction without a class choice principle. For this rea-
son, it is convenient to include in Boffa’s theory the global axiom of
choice, which allows one to make choices in such a context, relative
to a fixed class well-ordering of the sets. Thus, we work with BAFA
over the theory ZFGC−f or GBC−f , which includes the global axiom
of choice. Boffa’s theory has been used as a basis of formalization of
nonstandard analysis by Ballard and Hrba´cˇek [BH92].
In this article, we shall also make a few arguments in the theory as-
serting that the universe of sets is generated by a set or class of Quine
atoms. Such theories are closely connected with the permutation mod-
els of set theory. Permutation models were originally constructed for
the set theory ZFA with atoms (objects with no elements, but dis-
tinct from the empty set), which requires weakening of the axiom of
extensionality. Alternatively, one can replace atoms with Quine atoms,
simply by redefining the ∈-relation on the atoms to make them all into
self-singletons, that is, into Quine atoms; in this way extensionality is
preserved at the expense of dropping foundation, which may be con-
sidered a less drastic deviation from the axioms of ZFC. Let us explain
the precise meaning of being “generated”. For any transitive class A,
we define the cumulative hierarchy over A, the class denoted WF(A),
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as the elements appearing in the following recursive hierarchy:
WF0(A) = A,
WFα+1(A) = P(WFα(A)),
WFλ(A) =
⋃
α<λ
WFα(A) for limit λ
For example, the class of well-founded sets is simply WF(∅). When A
is a proper class, note that we take only the subsets of the previous
stage. In weaker set theories that may not be able to formalize this
recursion on classes directly, we may equivalently define that WF(A)
is the union of WF(t) for all sets t ⊆ A, and similarly WFα(A) =⋃
t⊆AWFα(t). Every set x ∈ WF(A) has a corresponding rank, the
least ordinal stage α for which x ∈ WFα+1(A). Such a rank function
leads to a weak form of the axiom of foundation in WF(A), namely,
every set x having an element y in WF(A) has such an element y
of least rank, and such an element y will either be in A or have no
elements in common with x, since any such element would have a lower
rank than y in x. In particular, every infinite ∈-descending sequence
containing a set in WF(A) must eventually reach an element of A. The
class WF(A) is transitive, as well as full, meaning that every subset of
WF(A) is an element of WF(A), and indeed, WF(A) is the smallest
full class containing A. When V = WF(A), then we say that the
universe is generated by A, and in some of our arguments below, we
shall consider models generated by a class of Quine atoms. Let us
introduce the notation At to refer always to the class of Quine atoms,
so that V = WF(At) just in case the universe is generated by its Quine
atoms.
All of the anti-foundational theories we consider in this article are
equiconsistent with ZFC and therefore also with GBC. A convenient
tool for showing the consistency of non-well-founded set theories is
Rieger’s theorem [Rie57] (cf. [Acz88]), which shows in ZFC−f that if
M is a class endowed with a relation E ⊆M ×M that is extensional,
set-like (meaning that the E-predecessors of any a ∈ M form a set)
and full (in the sense that every subset of M is the E-extension of
some a ∈ M), then 〈M,E〉 satisfies all the axioms of ZFC−f . If global
choice is available, then we may also expand 〈M,E〉 to a model of
global choice. In particular, any full transitive class, such as WF(A)
for any transitive class A, is a model of ZFC−f .
With suitable choices for such relations E (as explained in [Acz88]),
we may arrange that 〈M,E〉 is extensional, set-like and full, while also
satisfying AFA, SAFA, FAFA, or BAFA, whichever we prefer. In this
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way, inside any model of GBC we may construct models of GBC−f
plus any of these anti-foundational theories. Furthermore, the WF
of any full model 〈M,E〉 is isomorphic to the WF of the universe in
which it is constructed, and one may also incorporate classes into this
phenomenon. It follows that all these anti-foundational theories T are
conservative over ZFC (and hence also GBC), in the sense that T ⊢ φWF
if and only if ZFC ⊢ φ for any first-order formula φ, since every model
of ZFC will arise as the WF of a model of the anti-foundational theory
T , and similarly every model of GBC arises as the well-founded part
(including both sets and classes) of a model of T .
We have mentioned that in any model of ZFGC−f + BAFA, there
are a proper class of Quine atoms, and for any class A of Quine atoms,
we may form the transitive class WF(A) inside this model. In particu-
lar, the theories asserting GBC−f plus “the universe is generated by a
proper class of Quine atoms,” or “the universe is generated by a set of
five Quine atoms,” or “. . . by a set of precisely ℵ6 many Quine atoms,”
and so on, respectively, for any definable cardinality whose definition
is absolute to WF(A), are each equiconsistent with ZFC and conserva-
tive over ZFC for assertions about the well-founded sets. One may also
establish this directly from Rieger’s theorem rather than via BAFA.
2. Some meta-mathematical issues
A number of meta-mathematical issues arise in any formalization of
the Kunen inconsistency (we refer the readers to the discussion in the
preliminary section of [HKP12]). The most obvious issue, of course,
is that the quantifier involved in the assertion “there is no nontriv-
ial elementary embedding j” is a second-order quantifier, not directly
formalizable in the usual first-order theories such as ZFC. Many set
theorists prefer to interpret all talk of classes in ZFC as referring to the
first-order definable classes, and with such a formalization, the Kunen
inconsistency becomes a scheme, asserting of each possible definition of
j that it isn’t an elementary embedding of the universe. (For example,
Kanamori [Kan04] adopts this approach.) Nevertheless, this interpre-
tation seems to miss much of the substance of the theorem, because
there is an elementary proof of this formulation of the Kunen inconsis-
tency, a simple diagonal argument not relying on the axiom of choice
or any of the other combinatorial methods usually associated with the
Kunen inconsistency (see [Suz99] and further discussion in [HKP12]).
So it seems natural to use a second-order set theory, such as Go¨del–
Bernays or Kelly–Morse set theory. In GBC, we have class quantifiers
for expressing “∃j,” but then a second problem arises, namely, that it is
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not directly possible to express the assertion “j is elementary” in GBC.
Kunen himself originally formulated his theorem in Kelley–Morse set
theory KM precisely for this reason, since KM proves the existence of
a full satisfaction class for first-order truth, making the assertion “j
is elementary” expressible in KM. The Kelley-Morse theory, however,
is strictly stronger theory than ZFC, even for arithmetical statements,
and has a strictly higher consistency strength. Meanwhile, one can
actually carry out Kunen’s argument in the weaker theory GBC and
even in ZFC(j), which is equiconsistent with and conservative over
ZFC, by weakening the full elementarity of j to the assertion merely
that “j is Σ1-elementary,” which is formalizable in the first order lan-
guage of set theory with a predicate for the class j. The point is that
Kunen’s argument actually proves this stronger statement, that there
is no nontrivial Σ1-elementary embedding j from V to V , and indeed,
no ∆0-elementary cofinal embedding from V to V (see the discussion in
[HKP12]). Part of the reason for this is a lemma of Gaifman’s, which
asserts that if j : V → V is Σ1-elementary, then it is Σn-elementary
for every meta-theoretic natural number n, by an induction carried
out in the meta-theory. One issue here, however, is that Gaifman’s
lemma makes use of the fact that in ZF, every Σ1-elementary embed-
ding j : V → V is cofinal, in the sense that
⋃
j[V ] = V , and this is
no longer necessarily true in the absence of foundation, even with full
elementarity, as shown in theorem 4 statement 3, although we may still
assert that
⋃
j[V ] is full. It is relatively consistent with ZFC−f that
there exists a Σ1-elementary embedding j : V → V which is not elemen-
tary (although we omit the proof), and so this approach to formalizing
the Kunen inconsistency statement does not fully succeed.
Some set theorists note that the proofs of the Kunen inconsistency
show in fact that there can be no nontrivial elementary embedding
of the form j : Vλ+2 → Vλ+2, a stronger statement that is expressible
in the first-order language of set theory and provable in ZFC with no
talk of classes. This formulation of the Kunen assertion, however, is
not suitable in a context without foundation, since there could be an
embedding j : V → V which is nontrivial, but only on ill-founded sets
(as in theorem 2), and so ruling out j : Vλ+2 → Vλ+2 does not settle the
question for j : V → V in the anti-foundational context.
In this article, we shall take a pragmatic approach. Rather than
attempting to give a universally applicable definition of the Kunen
assertion, we shall instead simply present the strongest results we can
prove for each of the particular anti-foundational theories on a case-by-
case basis. Our results on the nonexistence of embeddings usually apply
already to Σ1-elementary embeddings, and we formulate them generally
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over GBC−f . Results on the existence of nontrivial embeddings provide
definable embeddings in the ZFC−f or ZFGC−f versions of the theories,
in which case the elementarity of the embedding can be formalized
as an infinite schema. Sometimes the theory proves the existence of
definable classes with a stronger property (given by a single formula)
which implies the infinite elementarity schema; in particular, this is the
case for automorphisms of the universe, meaning bijections j : V → V
satisfying x ∈ y ↔ j(x) ∈ j(y). A similar situation will arise with the
elementary embeddings that we construct by threading a back-and-
forth system of embeddings from one model to another.
Let us stress that throughout the paper, elementary embeddings and
isomorphisms are only supposed to be elementary with respect to the
first-order language of set theory; they need not be elementary with re-
spect to the second-order language of classes, when working in GBC−f ,
or with respect to the language including the global choice bijection of
Ord with V , when working in ZFGC−f .
3. The Kunen inconsistency on the well-founded sets
Let us now finally begin in earnest with the observation that a frag-
ment of the Kunen inconsistency survives in set theory without the
foundation axiom as the claim that there are no nontrivial elementary
self-embeddings on the well-founded part of the universe.
Theorem 1. Work either in GBC−f or in ZFC−f . Then there is no
nontrivial Σ1-elementary embedding j : WF → WF. In particular, ev-
ery Σ1-elementary embedding j : V → V fixes every well-founded set:
j(x) = x for all x ∈ WF. Furthermore, the range j[V ] of any such
embedding is a transitive full class.
Proof. Consider the structure W obtained by restricting the universe
to have only the objects in WF and to have only the classes A with
A ⊆ WF. Since WF is a definable class in the full universe, it follows
that A∩WF is a class whenever A is, and it is an elementary exercise
to see that W is a model of GBC. In particular, if j : WF→WF were
a nontrivial Σ1-elementary embedding of WF, then j would be a class
inW and furthermore would be a nontrivial Σ1-elementary embedding
of the entire set-theoretic universe from the perspective ofW, contrary
to the original Kunen inconsistency, which shows that there can be no
such embedding in any model of GBC.
Alternatively, if j : WF → WF were nontrivial and Σ1-elementary,
then since WF |= ZFC it follows that j must have a critical point κ, and
then one can define the critical sequence κn+1 = j(κn) and λ = supn κn.
FOUNDATION AXIOM AND SELF-EMBEDDINGS OF THE UNIVERSE 11
It follows easily that j(λ) = λ and consequently j ↾ Vλ+2 : Vλ+2 → Vλ+2
is an elementary embedding from Vλ+2 to itself, which violates one of
the ZFC formulations of the Kunen inconsistency inside WF.
For the further claims of the theorem, we claim that if j : V → V
is Σ1-elementary, then j ↾ WF: WF → WF is also Σ1-elementary and
hence trivial by the arguments of the previous paragraphs. To see
this, note first that x ∈ WF is Π1 definable, since x ∈ WF just in
case there is no infinite ∈-descending sequence starting from x, and so
j[WF] ⊆WF. (And the reader may find it helpful to note that the Σ1-
elementarity of j implies that j preserves true Σ2 assertions.) Similarly,
j[Ord] is cofinal in Ord, since being an ordinal is also Π1 definable (note
that the usual ∆0 definitions of being an ordinal in ZFC do not work
in the anti-foundational context). Since x ∈ WFα just in case there
is a ranking function, a function f : t → α for some transitive set t
for which x ∈ t and a ∈ b → f(a) < f(b). Since membership in WFα
is therefore a Σ1 property in parameter α, it follows that y = WFα
has complexity Σ1 ∧ Π1 in y and α, namely, every set in y has an α-
ranking function and every set with an α-ranking function is in y, and so
j(WFα) = WFj(α). To see that j ↾ WF: WF→WF is Σ1-elementary,
notice that if there is an existential witness on the right side, WF |=
∃xφ(x, j(u)), where φ is ∆0, then the witness x is found in some WFβ,
which is contained in some WFj(α), since j[Ord] is cofinal in Ord, and
so V |= ∃x ∈ WFj(α) φ(x, j(u)), which implies ∃x ∈ WFα φ(x, u) by
the Σ1-elementarity of j, and so WF |= ∃xφ(x, u) as desired.
In order to show that the range of j is transitive, assume x ∈ j(u),
and by the axiom of choice fix a bijection f : κ→ u with some ordinal κ.
It follows that j(f) : j(κ)→ j(u) is also a bijection, and so x = j(f)(α)
for some ordinal α. But since j is the identity on ordinals, it follows
that α = j(α) and so x = j(f)(α) = j(f)(j(α)) = j(f(α)), which
places x into the range of j, as desired.
Finally, to verify fullness, suppose x ⊆ j[V ]. Let u = j−1[x], so that
x = j[u]. Clearly j[u] ⊆ j(u), but since j(u) ⊆ j[V ] by transitivity, we
achieve also the converse, and so j(u) = j[u] = x. 
The fact that the range of such an embedding j must be transitive
makes them totally different in character than the kinds of embeddings
that are usually considered in the ZFC context, which never have tran-
sitive range.
12 DAGHIGHI, GOLSHANI, HAMKINS, AND JERˇA´BEK
4. Theories with nontrivial self-embeddings of the
universe
We shall now prove that ZFC without the foundation axiom is rel-
atively consistent with the existence of nontrivial automorphisms of
the set-theoretic universe. In particular, if ZFC is consistent, then the
Kunen inconsistency assertion is not provable in ZFC or GBC without
making use of the axiom of foundation. We begin with the theories
where the universe is generated by its Quine atoms, a situation where
the automorphisms and elementary embeddings have a very transpar-
ent structure, admitting a complete description.
Theorem 2. Work in GBC−f or ZFC−f and assume that the universe
is generated by its Quine atoms, so that V = WF(At).
(1) If j : V → V is an automorphism of the universe V , then j ↾ At
is a permutation of the class of atoms At.
(2) Every permutation σ : At → At of the atoms has a unique ex-
tension to an automorphism σ : V → V of the entire universe.
Proof. The first assertion is clear, as the class of Quine atoms is defin-
able. For the second assertion, suppose that σ is a permutation of the
class of Quine atoms At. We may extend this to a permutation σ of
all of WF(At) by the following recursion:
(∗) σ(x) =
{
σ(x) if x ∈ At,
σ[x] otherwise
We may view this directly as a recursion on the set-like well-founded
relation ∈ \ idAt, or alternatively, as defining σ ↾WF(At)α by recursion
on the rank α. It follows easily by induction that σ ↾ WF(At)α is an
∈-preserving automorphism of WF(At)α, for every ordinal α, and so
σ : V → V is an automorphism of the entire universe V . Furthermore,
any automorphism extending σ must obey (∗), and so σ is the unique
such extension of σ to all of V . 
In particular, if At consists of at least two Quine atoms, then we
have a permutation swapping two of them (leaving the rest in place),
and so we may extend this to an automorphism of the entire universe
WF(At), which will be definable from the Quine atoms to be swapped.
In theorem 4, we shall use the recursion (∗) even when σ : At → At is
merely injective, yielding an embedding σ : WF(At)→WF(At).
Corollary 3. Work in ZFC−f . If the universe is generated by its Quine
atoms, V = WF(At), and there are at least two Quine atoms, then there
is a nontrivial automorphism of V , definable from parameters.
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If the universe is generated from exactly two atoms, then we don’t
need any parameters to define the automorphism, since in this case
σ and hence σ are both definable without parameters, since there is
only one nontrivial permutation of a two-element set. The theorem
generalizes from automorphisms to elementary embeddings as follows.
Theorem 4. Work in GBC−f or ZFC−f , and assume the universe is
generated by its Quine atoms, so that V = WF(At).
(1) If j : V → V is a Σ1-elementary embedding, then j ↾ At is
an injection of At to At, and j = j ↾ At using the notation
from (∗).
(2) If At is a set, every Σ1-elementary embedding j : V → V is an
automorphism.
(3) (Assuming global choice.) If the class of Quine atoms At is a
proper class and σ : At → At is injective, then j = σ : V → V
is an elementary embedding, that is, Σn-elementary for every
particular natural number n.
Proof. (1) The first assertion is clear as j(a) ∈ j(a) for any a ∈ At.
Also, j(x) ⊇ j[x]. On the other hand, since j[V ] is transitive by theo-
rem 1, every element of j(x) is of the form j(y), where necessarily y ∈ x,
and so j(x) = j[x], which implies that j obeys (∗).
(2) The property of being the set of all atoms is Π1, and so j(At) =
At. But since the range of j is transitive, it follows that j[At] = At
and hence j ↾ At is a permutation, which implies that j = j ↾ At is an
automorphism.
(3) This statement is a theorem scheme, a separate statement for
each meta-theoretic natural number n. Assume that At is a proper
class, with an injection σ : At → At. Let j = σ : V → V be the
corresponding embedding arising from σ via (∗), and let A = σ[At],
which is a proper class subclass of At. Since inductively j is an isomor-
phism of WFα(At) with WFα(A), for every ordinal α, it follows that
j is an isomorphism of WF(At) with WF(A). In order to see that j
is Σn-elementary from V to V , therefore, it therefore suffices to show
that WF(A) ≺Σn WF(At). For this, we verify the Tarski–Vaught crite-
rion: assume that a Σn statement φ(u, x) holds in V with u ∈WF(A)
and x ∈ V , we have to find v ∈ WF(A) such that φ(u, v). Fix sets
a ⊆ A and a ⊆ b ⊆ At such that u ∈ WF(a) and x ∈ WF(b).
Using global choice, we can find an injection of b into A identical
on a, which we can extend to a permutation τ : At → At. Since τ
is an automorphism identical on WF(a), we have φ(u, τ(x)), where
τ(x) ∈WF(τ [b]) ⊆WF(A). 
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We remark that statement (2) applies more generally: if V = WF(t)
for some set t, then every Σ1-elementary embedding j : V → V is an
automorphism: since V = WF(t) is a Π1 property of t, asserting that
every infinite ∈-descending sequence contains an element of t, it follows
that V = WF(j(t)), which implies V = j[V ] as j[V ] is full.
Corollary 5. Work in ZFC−f and assume that the universe is gener-
ated from a proper class of Quine atoms. Then there is an embedding
j : V → V , definable from parameters and Σn-elementary for every
particular n, which is not an automorphism.
Proof. The result follows from theorem 4 statement 3, if we have global
choice. But let us prove it without global choice, using only the usual
first-order axiom of choice. Since At is a proper class, we can prove
the existence of at least n atoms for every n ∈ ω by induction on n.
Using collection and choice, we can thus find an infinite countable set
{an : n ∈ ω} ⊆ At. Define σ : At → At by σ(an) = an+1 and σ(a) = a
otherwise. This injection extends as in theorem 4 to an isomorphism
σ of WF(At) with WF(A), where A = At \ {a0}. In the proof of
the elementarity of WF(A) in WF(At) in theorem 4, we can assume
b = a ∪ {a0}, hence we can define τ as a transposition of a0 with any
atom in At \ b without using any choice.
Thus, the embedding j we produce arises via (∗) from an injection
on At, and our argument shows as a theorem scheme that any embed-
ding arising this way is Σn-elementary for any meta-theoretic natural
number n. 
As we mentioned after corollary 3, in ZFC−f + V = WF(At), where
At has precisely two Quine atoms, the unique nontrivial automorphism
from theorem 2 is definable without parameters, as it is induced by
swapping the two atoms. On the other hand, if |At| 6= 2, there is no
nontrivial parameter-free definable Σ1-elementary embedding, because
any parameter-free definable class is preserved by all automorphisms,
but the only function At→ At that commutes with every permutation
is the identity.
Let us now move on to Boffa’s theory, which turns out to be rich in
elementary embeddings and automorphisms. We shall start with some
general remarks on basic consequences of BAFA. First, the axiom can
be equivalently formulated in the following more convenient form: if
〈a, e〉 is an extensional binary relation which is an end-extension of
〈a0, e0〉, and f0 is an isomorphism from 〈a0, e0〉 to 〈t0,∈〉 with tran-
sitive t0, there exists an isomorphism f : 〈a, e〉 → 〈t,∈〉 extending f0
with transitive t.
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Using global choice, BAFA implies a generalized Mostowski collapse
lemma, asserting that every set-like extensional relation E on a class A
is isomorphic to the ∈ relation on some transitive class T . (The usual
Mostowski collapse applies only to well-founded relations.) This can be
shown by writing A as the union of an increasing chain {aα : α ∈ Ord}
of E-transitive subsets aα ⊆ A, and constructing an increasing chain of
isomorphisms fα : 〈aα, E ↾ aα〉 → 〈tα,∈〉 with transitive tα. Its union
is then an isomorphism of 〈A,E〉 to T =
⋃
α tα. This has immedi-
ate consequences for the construction of elementary embeddings of V
into transitive classes M . For example, every ultrapower 〈V I/U,∈U〉
of the universe by an ultrafilter U on a set I gives rise to the corre-
sponding set-like extensional relation ∈U , which therefore is realized as
a transitive class 〈M,∈〉 ∼= 〈V I/U,∈U〉 via the generalized Mostowski
collapse, and so the ultrapower map provides an elementary embedding
j : V → M into a transitive class M , even when U is not countably
complete, which of course does not happen in ZFC. This feature is es-
sential for the development of nonstandard analysis in the framework
of [BH92]. However, one cannot construct a nontrivial elementary em-
bedding into V itself in this way.
An important special case of BAFA is that every isomorphism of
transitive sets can be extended to an isomorphism whose domain and
range contains any given set. This means that the class of all isomor-
phisms of transitive sets forms a back-and-forth system from V to V
(see [Mar02]), and consequently BAFA proves (as a scheme) that ev-
ery isomorphism of transitive sets preserves the truth of any particular
formula. With global choice, one can carry out the full back-and-forth
construction:
Theorem 6. ZFGC−f +BAFA proves that every isomorphism of tran-
sitive sets can be extended to an automorphism of the universe. In
particular, there exist nontrivial automorphisms.
Proof. Let f0 be any isomorphism of transitive sets. Using global choice
and the back-and-forth property we just mentioned above, we may con-
struct an increasing chain {fα : α ∈ Ord} of isomorphisms of transitive
sets such that every set eventually belongs to dom(fα) ∩ ran(fα) as α
becomes large. The union j =
⋃
α∈Ord fα is therefore an automorphism
of V extending f0. If f0 itself is nontrivial, such as an isomorphism
of one Quine atom with another, we thereby ensure that j is nontriv-
ial. 
Remark 7. It is not difficult to prove in BAFA that if a is any set
and b /∈ WF(TC(a)), then there is a proper class of sets isomorphic
to b by an isomorphism fixing a. In view of theorem 6, this means
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that the orbit of b under automorphisms of V fixing a is a proper class,
suggesting a rich Galois theory here.
Turning from automorphisms to general elementary embeddings, we
have the following criterion.
Theorem 8. Work in ZFGC−f + BAFA or GBC−f + BAFA. The
following are equivalent for any class M .
(1) M = j[V ] for some elementary embedding j : V → V .
(2) M = j[V ] for some Σ1-elementary embedding j : V → V .
(3) M is transitive and isomorphic to V .
(4) M is a full transitive model of BAFA.
Proof. The formalization of statement 1 is problematic, since we cannot
express it directly even as a scheme. What we mean by including it
here is that, first, it contains statement 2 as an immediate special case;
and second, if statement 4 holds, then using M and the global choice
function we may define a particular class embedding j : V → V for
which M = j[V ] and prove that any class satisfying this definition is
Σn-elementary for any particular natural number n. The implication
(1)→ (2) is thereby clear, and (3)→ (4) also, since isomorphisms are
truth-preserving for any given assertion. The implication (2) → (3)
follows from theorem 1.
For the remaining implication (4) → (1), let I be the class of all
isomorphisms f : t → s of transitive sets, with s ⊆ M . We claim
that I is a back-and-forth system from V to M . The back direction
follows directly from BAFA; for the forth direction, let f ∈ I be as
above, and t′ ⊇ t be a transitive set. Using the axiom of choice, we can
construct an isomorphism g : 〈t′,∈〉 → 〈a, e〉 extending f , where 〈a, e〉
is an extensional structure end-extending 〈s,∈〉 such that a \ s ⊆ Ord.
Since M is full, 〈a, e〉 ∈M , hence there is an isomorphism h : 〈a, e〉 →
〈s′,∈〉 extending ids for some transitive set s
′ ∈M using M |= BAFA.
Then f ′ = h ◦ g ∈ I extends f to t′.
Using transfinite recursion as in the proof of theorem 6, we can con-
struct an isomorphism j : V ≃ M , which will be definable from M and
the global choice function. Moreover, if a ∈ M , then idTC({a}) ∈ I can
be extended in the same way to an isomorphism of V to M fixing a.
This implies (as a scheme) that M and V must agree on the truth of
any particular formula having parameters in M , and so j : V → V is
an elementary embedding, in the sense that it is Σn-elementary for any
particular n. 
Theorem 9. In the theory ZFGC−f +BAFA, there is a definable class
elementary embedding j : V → V , which is not an automorphism.
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Proof. This is technically a theorem scheme, since we assert that the
particular class embedding j : V → V that we define is Σn-elementary
for every particular natural number n. The class j will be defined
relative to the global choice function that is available in ZFGC−f . Let
A = (V × {0}) ∪ {a}, a = 〈1, 1〉 and E = {〈〈x, 0〉, 〈y, 0〉〉 : x ∈ y} ∪
{〈a, a〉}; thus, 〈A,E〉 is a disjoint union of an isomorphic copy of V
and an additional Quine atom. By the generalized Mostowski collapse,
there is an isomorphism F : 〈A,E〉 → 〈T,∈〉 to a transitive class T . Let
j be the composition of F with the natural inclusion of V in A. Then j
is an isomorphism of V to a transitive class M = T \ {F (a)} ( V , and
M is an elementary substructure of V by theorem 8, hence j : V → V
is an elementary embedding which is not an automorphism. 
Although the nontrivial automorphisms and elementary embeddings
arising in theorems 6 and 9 were definable, these definitions made essen-
tial use of the global choice function, in order to carry out the transfinite
back-and-forth construction. We now show that one cannot define such
embeddings in the first-order language of set theory alone:
Theorem 10. ZFC−f + BAFA proves that there is no nontrivial ∆0-
elementary embedding j : V → V of the universe with itself that is
definable (with set parameters) in the first-order language of set theory.
Proof. This is a theorem scheme, a separate statement for each possible
definition, asserting that it does not define a nontrivial ∆0-elementary
embedding of the universe V to itself. Assume that such an embed-
ding j is definable using parameters from a transitive set u. Since set
isomorphisms preserve any particular formula, remark 7 implies that
j(x) ∈WF(u∪TC(x)) for every x. Given any set x, let y be a set such
that y = {y, x} using Boffa’s axiom. Then j(y) = {j(y), j(x)}, and
j(y) ∈ WF(u ∪ TC(y)) = WF(u ∪ TC({x}) ∪ {y}). Since j(y) ∈ j(y),
the least α such that j(y) ∈ WFα(u ∪ TC({x}) ∪ {y}) must be 0, so
j(y) ∈ u ∪ TC({x}) ∪ {y}. Since j−1[u ∪ TC({x})] is a set, but there
is a proper class of solutions to y = {y, x}, we may assume that we
choose y so that j(y) /∈ u ∪ TC({x}). But in this case j(y) = y and
consequently j(x) = x. 
Much of the material we have presented in this section on BAFA
has been already known; for more information on automorphisms and
elementary embeddings in ZFGC−f + BAFA, we refer the reader to
[Paj99, Jer01].
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5. Automorphisms and elementary embeddings of the
universe
In the previous section, we produced models exhibiting several pat-
terns of possibility for the existence of nontrivial automorphisms and
nontrivial elementary embeddings of the universe. Specifically, we have
a model with nontrivial automorphisms, but no other nontrivial ele-
mentary embeddings (corollary 3 and theorem 4 statement 2); we have
a model with nontrivial automorphisms and other nontrivial elemen-
tary embeddings (theorem 4 statement 3); and we have the models of
ZFC, which have no nontrivial automorphisms and no nontrivial ele-
mentary embeddings (by the Kunen inconsistency itself). We should
like now to round out these possibilities with the missing case, namely,
a model of set theory having nontrivial elementary embeddings, but no
nontrivial automorphisms.
Theorem 11. If ZFC is consistent, there is a model of GB−f + AC
having a class j : V → V that is an elementary embedding of the uni-
verse to itself, but in which no class is a nontrivial automorphism of
the universe.
Proof. Let us explain more precisely what we mean. Assuming ZFC is
consistent, we shall construct a model of GB−f + AC that has a class
j that is a Σn-elementary embedding j : V → V of the universe to
itself, for every meta-theoretic natural number n, but no class in the
model is a nontrivial automorphism of the universe. Actually, we may
make a more uniform claim, producing a model of GBC−f +BAFA, for
which there is a formula Φ(X) such that the model satisfies the single
statement “the collection of classes satisfying Φ is closed under the
class-formation axioms of GB−f , and there is a non-identical function
j : V → V preserving all classes satisfying Φ”.
If ZFC is consistent, then there is a model of GBC−f + BAFA, and
we shall work inside that model. Therefore, assume GBC−f + BAFA
and let Ord = Ord∪{∞}, where α < ∞ for all α ∈ Ord. Fix a
bijection between a proper class A of Quine atoms, and the class of all
sequences a : ω → Ord such that a(m) =∞ for all but finitely many m.
We will identify a ∈ A with the corresponding sequence in notation.
Let < denote the lexicographic order on A, namely,
a < b↔ ∃n ∈ ω (a ↾ n = b ↾ n ∧ a(n) < b(n)),
and let An = {a ∈ A : ∀m ≥ n a(m) = ∞}. Notice that 〈A,<〉 is a
dense linear order with largest element ∞∗ (the constant ∞ sequence)
and no least element, whereas 〈An, <〉 is a well-order isomorphic to the
lexicographic order on Ord
n
.
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Let us also fix a set ra,b such that ra,b = 〈ra,b, a, b〉 for every a, b ∈ A
such that a < b. Note that the sets ra,b are pairwise distinct, and they
are not in WF(A). For any subclass B ⊆ A, denote
WF<(B) = WF(B ∪ {ra,b : a, b ∈ B, a < b}).
Let Mn = WF
<(An) and M =
⋃
n∈ωMn. The first-order part of our
desired model will be 〈M,∈〉. The purpose of adding the sets ra,b is to
make < definable in M , since a < b↔ M |= a 6= b ∧ ∃xx = 〈x, a, b〉.
The classes of our model will be the subclasses ofM that are invariant
under certain partial isomorphisms, which we now describe. Let PM(A)
be the class of all subsets of A that belong to M , that is, subsets
of An for some n ∈ ω. Let I denote the class of all order-preserving
isomorphisms f : u→ v where u, v ∈ PM(A) and ∞∗ ∈ u, v.
Lemma 11.1. Let f ∈ I, f : u → v, v ⊆ An. For every u ⊆ u
′ ∈
PM(A), there exists f ′ ∈ I such that f ⊆ f ′ and f ′ : u′ → v′ where
v′ ⊆ An+1.
Proof. Since u′ is well-ordered, we can find an increasing enumeration
u′ \ u = {a′α : α < γ}. For each α < γ, let aα be the smallest
element of u larger than a′α (note that a
′
α <∞
∗ ∈ u, so aα exists). By
assumption, (f(aα))(m) =∞ for all m ≥ n; let f
′(a′α) be the sequence
in An+1 which differs from f(aα) only in the nth coordinate, where we
put (f ′(a′α))(n) = α. Then f
′ has the required properties. 
Every order-isomorphism f : u → v from I uniquely extends to an
∈-isomorphism f : WF<(u) → WF<(v), since f(ra,b) = rf(a),f(b) is the
unique set in M satisfying x = 〈x, f(a), f(b)〉, and then we use well-
founded recursion on ∈ to make f(x) = f [x]. More generally, for
any k ∈ ω, let sk : A→ A denote the shift operator (sk(a))(n) = a(n+
k), and let f
k
be the unique isomorphism WF<(s−1k [u])→WF
<(s−1k [v])
such that for any a ∈ s−1k [u], f
k
(a) ↾ k = a ↾ k and sk(f
k
(a)) =
f(sk(a)). That is, we leave the first k elements of a unchanged and
apply f to the tail of the sequence. If k ∈ ω and u ∈ PM(A), we say
that a relation R ⊆M r is k-invariant, if f
k
preserves R for every f ∈ I,
meaning that
R(x1, . . . , xr)↔ R(f
k
(x1), . . . , f
k
(xr))
for all x1, . . . , xr ∈ dom(f
k
).
Observe that R is k-invariant as an r-ary relation if and only if it is
as a (unary) class of r-tuples, because f
k
is an ∈-isomorphism. If R is
k-invariant, it is also k′-invariant for any k′ > k.
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Our model will be M = 〈M,X ,∈〉, where X is the collection of
all subclasses of M that are k-invariant for some k ∈ ω. Formally,
X is not an object of any kind in our model; rather, we are defining
a (parametric) interpretation of GB−f in GBC−f + BAFA, delimiting
classes of the interpreted theory by a formula of the background theory.
Lemma 11.2.
(1) For every k ∈ ω, the collection of k-invariant relations is closed
under first-order definability and contains ∈.
(2) M |= GB−f +AC.
(3) M |= “every automorphism of 〈V,∈〉 is the identity”.
Proof. (1) Closure under Boolean operations is trivial. Let S(x) ↔
∃y R(x, y), so that S = dom(R), where R is k-invariant, and fix f ∈ I,
f : u→ v, and x ∈WF<(s−1k [u]). If S(x), fix a y ∈M such thatR(x, y),
and u′ ∈ PM(A) such that y ∈ WF<(u′). By lemma 11.1, there is
g ⊇ f in I such that dom(g) ⊇ sk[u
′]. Then y ∈ dom(gk), hence
R(gk(x), gk(y)), which implies S(gk(x)), where gk(x) = f
k
(x). The
other direction is symmetric.
(2) Being a full transitive class, each WF<(u) is a model of ZFC−f ,
hence M is a model of ZFC−f without collection. In M, any set is a
class as every x ∈WF<(u) with u ⊆ An is n-invariant, andM satisfies
the class formation axioms of GB−f by (1), it remains to show that it
satisfies collection. Assume that ∀x ∈ z ∃y R(x, y), where R ⊆ M2 is
k-invariant, and z ∈ Mk. If x ∈ z and y ∈ M satisfy R(x, y), fix u ∈
PM(A) such that y ∈WF<(u). By lemma 11.1, there exists f ∈ I such
that dom(f) ⊇ sk[u] and ran(f) ⊆ Ak+1. Then f
k
(x) = x as f(∞∗) =
∞∗, f
k
(y) ∈ Mk+1, and R(x, f
k
(y)). Thus ∀x ∈ z ∃y ∈ Mk+1R(x, y).
Using collection in the background theory, there is a subset w ⊆Mk+1
such that ∀x ∈ z ∃y ∈ wR(x, y); we have w ∈ Mk+1 ⊆ M as Mk+1 is
full.
(3) Let j : M → M be a k-invariant automorphism. Since A and <
are definable in M , it follows that j restricts to an automorphism
of 〈A,<〉. Fix n ≥ k; we claim that j[An] = An. Assume for contra-
diction that j(a) = b where a ∈ An 6∋ b (the other case is symmetric).
Then sn(a) =∞
∗ 6= sn(b). Let f be an order-preserving function with
domain {∞∗, sn(b)} such that f(sn(b)) 6= sn(b). Then f
n
(a) = a and
f
n
(b) 6= b, contradicting the n-invariance of j. Thus, j restricts to an
automorphism of 〈An, <〉. Since this is a well order, it follows that
j ↾ An = id, and this implies j ↾ Mn = id. Since n ≥ k was arbitrary,
the entire automorphism is trivial j = id, as desired. 
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Let σ : A → A be the function such that (σ(a))(0) = 1 + a(0)
and s1(σ(a)) = s1(a), so that σ(〈a0, a1, a2, . . . 〉) = 〈1 + a0, a1, a2, . . . 〉.
Since σ is an order-preserving bijection from A to
A′ = {a ∈ A : a(0) 6= 0},
it has a unique extension to an isomorphism j : M →WF<(A′), namely
j is the directed union of the isomorphisms f : WF<(u)→WF<(σ[u]),
where ∞∗ ∈ u ∈ PM(A) and f = σ ↾ u.
Lemma 11.3. Both σ and j are 1-invariant and consequently belong
to X . The embedding j preserves all 0-invariant classes, and in par-
ticular, j : M → M is a nontrivial elementary embedding.
Proof. The 1-invariance of σ is clear from the definition, as
σ(f
1
(〈a0, a1, a2, . . . 〉)) = σ(〈a0, f(〈a1, a2, . . . 〉)〉)
= 〈1 + a0, f(〈a1, a2, . . . 〉)〉
= f
1
(〈1 + a0, a1, a2, . . . 〉)
= f
1
(σ(〈a0, a1, a2, . . . 〉)),
and j is definable in 〈M,∈, σ〉, hence it is also 1-invariant by lemma 11.2.
The preservation of 0-invariant relations follows from the fact that
if x ∈ WF<(u) with ∞∗ ∈ u, then f := σ ↾ u ∈ I, and f
0
(x) = j(x).
This implies any instance of elementarity, since the relation defined
by any formula without parameters is 0-invariant by lemma 11.2 and
hence preserved by j. 
Theorem 11 now follows from lemmas 11.2 and 11.3, and the proof
is complete. 
Extending the idea of the previous argument, notice that we may
extend σk(〈a0, a1, . . . 〉) = 〈a0, . . . , ak−1, 1+ak, ak+1, . . . 〉 to a nontrivial
(k+1)-invariant embedding jk : M → M which preserves all k-invariant
classes. In particular, we may form the structure 〈M,∈, j0, j1, j2, . . . 〉,
which is a model of ZFC−f(j0, j1, . . . ) + “there is no nontrivial auto-
morphism of 〈V,∈〉” + “jk is a nontrivial elementary self-embedding of
〈V,∈, j0, . . . , jk−1〉” for every k.
Let us introduce some notation to help summarize what we’ve done.
Let Aut(V ) denote the collection of automorphisms of V and, infor-
mally, let Eem(V ) the collection of elementary embeddings of V . This
latter notation is informal, because in light of the issues mentioned in
section 2, we are not actually able to express the property “j : V → V
is an elementary embedding” as a single assertion about the class j,
even in the full second-order language of Go¨del–Bernays set theory.
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We are able to express that a class j : V → V is Σn-elementary for
any particular natural number n in the meta-theory, and in this way
we can say of any specific class j that “j : V → V is elementary” as
an infinite scheme of statements, and this scheme-theoretic treatment
of elementarity suffices for many applications. Meanwhile, in contrast,
the property “j : V → V is an automorphism” is a first-order express-
ible property of j, and one can prove that any such automorphism is
Σn-elementary for any particular natural number n in the meta-theory.
We have produced models of ZFC−f realizing all four separating re-
finements of the fact that {idV } ⊆ Aut(V ) ⊆ Eem(V ).
(1) {idV } = Aut(V ) = Eem(V ). Models of ZFC have no nontrivial
automorphisms or elementary self-embeddings of universe, and
indeed no nontrivial Σ1-elementary self-embeddings.
(2) {idV } ( Aut(V ) = Eem(V ). If V = WF(A) for a set A of
at least two Quine atoms, then there are nontrivial automor-
phisms, but no other nontrivial elementary embeddings.
(3) {idV } = Aut(V ) ( Eem(V ). The model of theorem 11 has no
nontrivial automorphisms, but does have a nontrivial elemen-
tary embedding.
(4) {idV } ( Aut(V ) ( Eem(V ). If V = WF(A) for a proper class
of Quine atoms, then there are nontrivial automorphisms, as
well as non-automorphic nontrivial elementary embeddings.
In the case of statement (2), the model V = WF(A) for a set A of
Quine atoms, we have Aut(V ) = Aut(A), the permutation group of
the set A. In fact, let us now show that every group can arise this way.
Theorem 12. Assume GBC−f+BAFA. Then for every group G, there
is a transitive set AG whose automorphism group is isomorphic to G,
and the automorphism group of the corresponding cumulative universe
WF(AG) generated over this set is also isomorphic to G, in the sense
that every automorphism of AG extends to a unique automorphism of
WF(AG) and every automorphism of WF(AG) arises this way.
Proof. Work in GBC−f + BAFA, and fix any group G, which we may
assume is in WF, since it has an isomorphic copy there. Let AG consist
of the transitive closure of the following objects:
(1) Quine atoms ag for every g ∈ G, and
(2) Sets rg,h satisfying rg,h = 〈rg,h, ag, h, agh〉 for every g, h ∈ G.
If j : AG → AG is an automorphism of AG, then j must fix every ele-
ment of G, as these are in WF, and it must permute the Quine atoms
of AG. It follows that j(ag) = api(g) for some permutation pi of G
and furthermore that j(rg,h) = 〈j(rg,h), api(g), h, api(gh)〉 = rpi(g),h. Thus,
FOUNDATION AXIOM AND SELF-EMBEDDINGS OF THE UNIVERSE 23
the embedding j is determined uniquely by pi, and we may see also
that pi(gh) = pi(g)h, which implies that pi(h) = gh for every h, where
g = j(1). Conversely, for every g ∈ G, the permutation pi(h) = gh
extends to an automorphism jg of AG. Furthermore, jgh = jg ◦ jh, and
so g 7→ jg is an isomorphism of G with Aut(AG), meaning the auto-
morphisms of the structure 〈AG,∈〉. So the automorphism group of
the transitive set AG is isomorphic to G. Every automorphism of AG
extends canonically to an automorphism of WF(AG) via (∗), and con-
versely, every automorphism of WF(AG) arises from an automorphism
of AG, since it must permute the Quine atoms and the sets of the form
rgh. So in WF(AG), the full automorphism group of the universe is
definably isomorphic with G, in the sense that every automorphism of
AG extends to an automorphism of WF(AG) and every automorphism
WF(AG) arises as such an extension. 
6. Theories without nontrivial self-embeddings
Let us show now in contrast that there are no nontrivial elemen-
tary embeddings or automorphisms under Aczel’s anti-foundation ax-
iom and similar anti-foundational theories where equality of sets is
determined by the isomorphism type of the underlying ∈-relation on
the hereditary members of the set.
Theorem 13. Under GBC−f+IE, there is no nontrivial Σ1-elementary
embedding j : V → V of the universe to itself.
Proof. Suppose that j : V → V is a Σ1-elementary embedding of the
universe to itself. Take any x ∈ V , and let t be the transitive closure of
{x}. Since the range j[V ] is transitive by theorem 1, it follows that j[t]
is also transitive, and j ↾ t is an isomorphism of 〈t,∈〉 with 〈j(t),∈〉.
By IE, therefore, j ↾ t is the identity, and so j(x) = x. 
What is going on is this: under the IE principle, every transitive
set t is determined by the isomorphism type of the underlying directed
graph 〈t,∈〉; but by the axiom of choice, this graph has an isomorphic
copy in the well-founded universe WF, which is consequently fixed by
j. Thus, 〈t,∈〉 and 〈j(t),∈〉 are both isomorphic to the same graph and
hence to each other, and so j(t) = t. Applying this to the transitive
closure t of { x }, it follows that j(x) = x for every set x.
Corollary 14. Under GBC−f+AFA, GBC−f+SAFA, GBC−f+FAFA,
and more generally, GBC−f +AFA∼ for any regular bisimulation con-
cept ∼, there is no nontrivial Σ1-elementary embedding of the universe.
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The proof of theorem 13 makes a fundamental use of the axiom of
choice, both in order to know that j ↾ WF is trivial and to find a sur-
jection from a well-founded set to a given set. The proof of theorem 13
applies as is to GB−f +IE if we know a priori that j[V ] is transitive, in
particular GB−f+IE proves that there are no nontrivial automorphisms
of the universe. However, this does not resolve the case of general ele-
mentary embeddings, so it is natural to inquire whether one may prove
theorem 13 without the axiom of choice.
Question 15. Is it consistent with GB−f + AFA, ZF−f + AFA, or a
similar extension of ZF−f + IE that there is a nontrivial elementary
embedding of the universe to itself?
In light of the fact that it remains a prominent open question whether
one can prove the Kunen inconsistency in GB, that is, with the axiom
of foundation but without the axiom of choice, we shouldn’t expect an
easy negative answer to this question. But perhaps one might hope
for a positive answer by building a suitable model of AFA without
the axiom of choice, where some ill-founded sets have no well-founded
copies of their hereditary ∈-graphs and can be subject to nontrivial
embeddings.
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